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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the association between audit quality, culture value, size of firm and 
earnings reporting quality, using a sample of 328 transportation firms for the period of 2004-2009 
in seven Asian countries. This study fails to confirm that Big 4 auditors function as a constraint 
on earnings management practices. However, the empirical evidence reveals that firms in the 
countries scoring high on uncertainty avoidance tend to have lower levels of earnings 
management and thus higher quality of reported earnings. This study results also strongly support 
the political costs hypothesis which argues that larger firms are subject to more public scrutiny 
and political actions therein exhibiting less aggressive earnings management behavior.  
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Abstrak 
 
Penelitian ini menguji hubungan antara kualitas audit, nilai budaya, ukuran perusahaan dan 
kualitas laba yang dilaporkan, dengan menggunakan 328 perusahaan transportasi sebagai 
sampel untuk periode 2004-2009 pada tujuh negara di Asia. Penelitian ini gagal menunjukkan 
bahwa auditor dalam grup “The Big 4” berfungsi sebagai penghambat praktik manajemen laba. 
Akan tetapi, bukti empiris menunjukkan bahwa perusahaan-perusahaan di negara-negara yang 
memiliki skor budaya “penghindaran ketidakpastian” yang tinggi cenderung memiliki tingkat 
manajemen laba yang rendah dan oleh karena itu laba yang dilaporkan memiliki kualitas yang 
tinggi. Hasil penelitian ini juga sangat mendukung hipotesis biaya politis yang berpendapat 
bahwa perusahaan-perusahaan yang lebih besar lebih menjadi perhatian publik dan aksi politik 
yang ada di dalamnya menunjukkan perilaku manajemen laba yang tidak begitu agresif. 
 
Kata Kunci: Kualitas audit, Budaya, Ukuran perusahaan, Kualitas pelaporan laba, Perusahaan 
transportasi. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This study investigates the relationship be-
tween culture value, audit quality, and size of 
firms and earnings reporting quality in 328 
listed transportation firms of seven key Asian 
countries (China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, 
Korea, Malaysia and Singapore). These coun-
tries represent well the Asian work ethic in that 
they offer a mixed sample of economic vibran-
cy, impact of the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC), size, cultural and business ethos. Evi-
dence on corporate management behavior in 
managing reported earnings has been reported 
extensively in subsequent earnings manage-
ment research. However, there are fewer in-
sights within Asia and no known studies ex-
amining earnings management, and thus quali-
ty of earnings, in the transportation industry.  
Transportation is a high profile indus-
try in that it affects all aspects of business and 
government (Gong, Firth and Cullinane 2006). 
Transportation services are inextricably linked 
with the world economy and technological 
development. The significance of the transpor-
tation industry has been acknowledged since 
the 18th century, Adam Smith (1776) noted 
that shipping is one of the major catalysts of 
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economic development. Transportation is also 
a highly capital-intensive industry (Rodrigue 
2010). The large sums of money involved in 
investment and infrastructure need careful in-
vestment decisions thus the financial perfor-
mance of transportation companies is of major 
importance particularly to investors and finan-
cial analysts (Gong et al. 2006).  
In recent times the transportation in-
dustry has faced two significant problems: the 
energy and global economic crises. There 
have been tremendous variances in global oil 
prices both up and down, since the fourth 
quarter of 2007 with prices skyrocketing by 
mid-2008. These events clearly had a major 
impact on their business performance specifi-
cally operation costs as transportation firms 
are large consumers of energy, especially oil
1
. 
Approximately 25% of world’s energy de-
mands and more than 55% of all the global oil 
consumption each year is attributed to trans-
portation activities (Rodrigue and Comtois 
2009). In addition, the global economic crisis 
that began in July 2007 reduced demand for 
transportation services resulting in a substan-
tial decrease in revenues. The combination of 
these two crises has had a complex but nega-
tive effect on the transportation firms. These 
negative impacts on transportation firm’s fi-
nancial performance placed substantial pres-
sure on managers to manage their firm’s re-
ported earnings (Gramlich 1992). 
Earnings management is an issue of 
ongoing international importance to investors, 
policy makers, market analysts and public at 
large. In recent years, this topic has spawned 
many academic studies (e.g., Arya, Glover and 
Sunder 2003; Imhoff 2003) due to the rising 
number of high profile accounting scandals 
(e.g., Enron, Parmalat, HIH Insurance, Infor-
matics group). These unanticipated scandals 
erode investors’ confidence in financial re-
porting quality and arguably impede the effi-
cient flow of capital in financial markets 

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 The spiking of oil prices has major economic conse-
quences for the transportation companies and the wider 
economy. An oil price spike, in fact, creates a snowball 
effect driving up both wholesale and consumer prices 
as a result of increased transportation costs. 
(Jackson and Pitma 2001). The inherent dis-
cretion in accounting standards allows corpo-
rate management to exercise judgment in pre-
paring their financial reports. This judgment 
permits management to select or change ac-
counting methods exercising their judgment in 
order to increase, decrease or smooth earnings 
figures, creating opportunities for earnings 
management (Atik 2009).  
This study generates new insights on 
three main fronts. Firstly, this study, using data 
from several different country settings provides 
further evidence on the incentives of company 
managers to manage their reported earnings. 
Previous studies (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 
1997; Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser 1999; 
Burgstahler and Eames 2006; Daske, Gebhardt 
and McLeay 2006; Gore, Pope and Singh 
2007) generally limit their sample to U.S. or 
European firms. Using data from the Asian re-
gion generates broader insights and builds a 
better international profile of the earnings man-
agement behavior in an area of vastly increas-
ing international economic importance. Se-
condly, Asian countries are characterized as 
possessing relatively weaker corporate gover-
nance systems and facing lower litigation risks 
than the U.S. or European countries (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1997; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 
2003; Jaggi and Leung 2007). These differenc-
es in corporate governance structures and liti-
gation risks are expected to influence the level 
of earnings management in unique ways. 
Thirdly, this study improves the focus and lim-
its exogenous issues by focusing solely upon 
the transportation industry. Recent energy and 
global economic crises have had a marked neg-
ative impact on both cost of operation and rev-
enue of transportation firms, which in turn in-
creases pressure on their financial performance 
(Jaggi and Lee 2002; Steven 2002; Agarwal, 
Chomsisengphet, Liu and Rhee 2007; Charitou, 
Lambertides and Trigeorgis 2007). Such cir-
cumstances encourage corporate management 
to ‘creatively’ manage the firm’s reported earn-
ings (Gramlich 1992). 
The remainder of this paper is orga-
nized as follows. The next section establishes 
the theoretical framework underlying the beha-
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vior of earnings management. Section 3 de-
scribes the research design. Primary results in-
cluding descriptive statistics, correlations and 
regression analysis are presented in Section 4. 
Key results of the study and implications for 
future research are discussed in Section 5.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND  
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
This study, in response to both the growing 
concern for earnings quality and calls for more 
empirical research in academic literature, in-
vestigates the effects of culture value, audit 
quality and size of firm on the quality of finan-
cial reporting. Consistent with previous re-
search (e.g., Francis, LaFond, Olsson and 
Shipper 2004; Velury and Jenkins 2006; Ball 
and Shivakumar 2008; Tong and Miao 2011), 
the current study employs earnings manage-
ment as proxies for quality of financial report-
ing. Earnings management occurs when man-
agement take deliberate steps within the con-
straints of GAAP (Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles) to bring about a desired 
level of reported earnings (Tseng and Lai 
2007). Numerous studies have investigated 
whether managers manage reported earnings 
opportunistically under the flexibility of ac-
counting rules.  
The first group of literature explores 
management incentives to manage reported 
earnings around corporate events. Related top-
ics include initial public offerings (e.g., Rangan 
1998; Teoh, Welch and Wong 1998a; Teoh, 
Wong and Rao 1998; Teoh, Welch and Wong 
1998b; Shivakumar 2000; Bergstresser, Desai 
and Rauh 2006) and firm’s acquisitions (e.g., 
Perry and Williams 1994; Erickson and Wang 
1999; Louis 2004; Bergstresser et al. 2006).  
A second group of literature looks at 
managerial motivation to manage accounting 
earnings in response to their performance in-
centive schemes. These studies included, for 
example, bonus schemes (Healy 1985), stock-
based incentives (e.g., Coles, Hertzel and Kal-
pathy 2003; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; 
Burns and Kedia 2006), and dividend pay-
ments (Kasanen, Kinnunen and Niskanen 
1996; Daniel, Denis and Naveen 2008).  
A third classification of earnings man-
agement literature considers whether corporate 
management manages reported earnings to 
meet certain earnings benchmarks. Burgstah-
ler and Dichev (1997) propose that firms ap-
pear to manage earnings upwards to avoid re-
porting losses and reporting earnings decreas-
es. They state that an unusually low frequency 
of firms have small negative and small de-
clines in earnings and an unusually high inci-
dence of firms report small positive and small 
increases in earnings. Additionally, Degeorge 
et al. (1999) argue that management face 
strong incentives to manage reported account-
ing earnings to: (1) report zero or positive 
earnings, (2) sustain recent financial perfor-
mance, and (3) meet analysts’ earnings fore-
casts. This position is supported by Burgstah-
ler and Eames (2006) who found that U.S. 
firms’ managers are more likely to report 
earnings that meet or beat analyst estimates.  
This study adds to the second strand of 
literature and explores the impact of the cul-
ture value, auditor quality, and firm size on the 
earnings reporting quality of the sample com-
panies. 
 
Role of the Auditor? 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and DeAngelo 
(1981) argue that auditor quality depends on 
the relevance of the auditor’s report in examin-
ing contractual relationships and reporting 
breaches. In other words, Bartov et al. (2000) 
suggest that higher quality auditors prefer to 
report errors and irregularities and are unwil-
ling to accept questionable accounting practic-
es. Therefore, it is posited that high quality au-
ditors are expected to be more likely to detect 
the practice of earnings management (Becker, 
DeFond, Jiambalvo and Subramanyam 1998). 
It is felt that Big 4 audit firms may provide 
higher quality than those non-Big 4 (DeAngelo 
1981; Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Becker et 
al. 1998; Caneghem 2004). The Big 4 auditors 
have strong incentives to provide or maintain a 
high audit quality level due to the fact that they 
have: (1) a greater number of clients, (2) more 
opportunity to deploy significant resources to 
auditing (recruitment, training and technology), 
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and (3) more to lose, for example termination 
of other clients, loss of reputation, when they 
do not report a discovered breach (Caneghem 
2004; Chung, Firth and Kim 2005). 
Findings reported in numerous studies 
clearly support that the Big 4 auditors serve as 
an earnings management constraint. Using 
U.S. data, Becker et al. (1998) show that 
clients of Big 4 auditors report discretionary 
accruals relatively smaller than the discretio-
nary accruals reported by clients of non-Big 4. 
Krishnan (2003) documents that Big 4 audi-
tors are able to constrain aggressive and op-
portunistic reporting of discretionary accruals 
by their clients compared to non-Big 4 audi-
tors. Francis et al. (1999) argue that even 
though clients of Big 4 firms report higher 
level of total accruals, they have lower 
amounts of discretionary accruals. Based on 
U.K. sample, Gore, Pope and Singh (2001) 
suggest that cases of high levels of non-audit 
services Big 4 firms are more able to constrain 
earnings management than their counterparts. 
Chen, Lin and Zhou (2005) note that Big 4 
auditors associate with less earnings manage-
ment for Taiwan IPO firms. However, using a 
sample of Belgian publicly listed firms, 
Bauwhede et al. (2003) report that the superior 
performance of Big 4 over non-Big 4 auditors 
is only in the case of income-increasing earn-
ings management. 
Taken together, the evidence presented 
from these studies strongly indicates that Big 4 
auditors have more incentives to detect and 
constrain earnings management behavior than 
non-Big 4 auditors. Thus, the first hypothesis is:  
H
1
: Big 4 auditors have more incentive to con-
strain earnings management behavior in 
the transportation firms in the Asia region. 
 
Role of the Culture Value? 
Accounting theorists (Gray 1988) links cultur-
al values to accounting values and practices, 
while Hofstede (1983) quantifies his cultural 
dimensions among countries. Based on data 
from more than 116,000 questionnaires ans-
wered by employees of a large multinational 
corporation in 72 countries, Hofstede’s (1983) 
classifies four factors underlying differences 
in nations’ cultural values; these are indivi-
dualism, power distance, uncertainly avoid-
ance, and masculinity. These factors provide 
information about cultural differences across 
nations. Hofstede (1991) also notes the role of 
a fifth dimension of culture, long-term versus 
short- term orientation in life. However, there 
are difficulties to test the effect of accounting 
values on earnings management due to mea-
surement of accounting values and their rela-
tionship to cultural values. Therefore, to infer 
indirectly that accounting values affect earn-
ings management, this study examines wheth-
er a meaningful and significant relationship 
between Hofstede’s cultural values and earn-
ings management exist.  
This study proposes that accounting 
values affect the choices of earnings manage-
ment as different accounting practices result in 
different choices of accounting accruals. 
Among the most Hofstede’s (1983) classifica-
tion of the cultural values on earnings man-
agement, only Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) 
has a straightforward relationship with earn-
ings management. By definition, when a na-
tion avoids risk and creates security by em-
phasizing technology and buildings, laws and 
rules, and religion, it is considered high in 
UA. A weak UA society maintains a more re-
laxed atmosphere in which practice counts 
more than principles and deviance is more 
easily tolerated. In line with Guan and Pourja-
lali (2010), this study expects that company 
managers in high UA nations are less likely to 
manage their reported accounting earnings.  
Therefore, this research examines the 
hypotheses in relation to the cultural values 
suggested by Hofstede (1983), as follow:  
H
2
: Higher degree of Uncertainty Avoidance 
in a nation has less incentive to practice 
earnings management.  
 
Does Size matter? 
Some scholars suggest that firm size may influ-
ence earnings management behavior. Specifi-
cally, they argue that large firms are subject to 
more public scrutiny (Moses 1987) and are 
more politically sensitive (Watts and Zimmer-
man 1986) than small firms. Thus, it is ex-
	
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pected that larger firms tend to manage income 
relative to smaller firms. Previous studies (e.g., 
Lilien and Pastena 1982; Sutton 1988) find that 
large firms are more likely to engage in in-
come-decreasing accounting practices to avoid 
political actions of regulators. However, Wong 
(1988), Moyer (1990) and Scott (1991) report 
inconsistent results with the firm size hypothe-
sis. In addition, Ashari, Koh, Tan and Wong 
(1994) advance an opposing view arguing that 
larger firms are more closely scrutinized by 
analysts and investors, therefore, more infor-
mation is made available regarding those firms. 
Consequently, smoothed income signals from 
larger firms add little value to the firms; in oth-
er words, large firms have less incentive to 
smooth income figures. Based on mixed results 
to date, this study proposes a non-directional 
third hypothesis is:  
H
3
: Client firm size influences earnings man-
agement behavior of the transportation 
firms in the Asia region.  
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study examines transportation companies 
in China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, and Singapore for fiscal years end-
ing 2004 to 2009. All financial data is ga-
thered from One Source database. The initial 
population comprised the entire population of 
all 395 firms or 2,370 firm year observations 
that are grouped into five transportation classi-
fications (airlines, railroads, trucking, water 
and miscellaneous transportation). Full finan-
cial statements could not be collected for 
every year or every firm. This left a final use-
able sample of 328 companies or 1,640 firm-
year observations for the statistical analysis. 
The number of firm-year observations used in 
the tests was reduced to 1,094 because one 
extra year data is needed to compute discre-
tionary accruals (a proxy for earnings man-
agement). Table 1 presents an overview of the 
number of firm-year observations and trans-
portation firm classifications per each of the 
seven countries. 
This study employs unexpected or dis-
cretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings 
management. Consistent with contemporary 
studies in earnings management, this study 
focuses on the absolute (unsigned or non-
directional) value rather than the actual sign of 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings 
management. The magnitude of unsigned dis-
cretionary accruals is the best measure to indi-
cate the opportunistic behavior of manage-
ment without any concern as to whether they 
manage earnings numbers upwards or down-
wards (Francis et al. 1999; Ferguson, Seow 
and Young 2004; Walker 2004). Prior to esti-
mating discretionary accruals, total accruals 
(TAC) are calculated as: 
TAC
jt 
= (CA
jt
 – Cash
jt
) – (CL
jt
 – LTD
jt
 – ITP
jt
)  
 – DPA
jt 
(1) 
 
Where: 
TAC
jt
 = total accruals for firm j in time period 
t; CA
jt
 = change current assets for firm j from 
time period t-1 to t; Cash
jt
 = change cash bal-
ance for firm j from time period t-1 to t; CL
jt
 
= change current liabilities for firm j from time 
period t-1 to t; LTD
jt
 = change long-term debt 
included in current liabilities for firm j from 
time period t-1 to t; ITP
jt
 = change income tax 
payable for firm j from time period t-1 to t; and 
DPA
jt
 = depreciation and amortization expense 
for firm j from time period to t. 
 
Table 1: Data set: Number of firm-year observations and transportation firm classifications per country 
Country 
Firm-year observations Transportation firm classifications 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total Airlines Railroads 
Trucking 
Water 
Miscellaneous Total 
China 62 65 69 1 197 18 11 0 46 122 197 
Hong Kong 12 19 25 4 60 5 0 0 15 40 60 
India 15 13 15 11 54 7 2 1 38 6 54 
Japan 127 127 130 121 505 24 48 144 119 170 505 
Korea 34 34 34 0 102 6 3 30 45 18 102 
Malaysia 27 28 27 4 86 18 0 10 23 35 86 
Singapore 24 25 28 13 90 10 0 13 38 29 90 
Total 301 311 328 154 1,094 88 64 198 324 420 1,094 
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TAC is then decomposed into normal accruals 
(NAC) and discretionary accruals (DAC) using 
the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) 
model defined formally as: 
TAC
 jk,t
 / TA
jk,t-1
 =  
jt
 [1/ TA
jk,t-1
] +
jt 
[(REV
jk,t
 - REC
jk,t
)/ TA
jk,t-1
] + 
j,t 
[PPE
jk,t
 / 
TA
jk,t-1
] + 
jk,t  
(2) 
 
Where: 
TAC
 jk,t
 = total accruals for firm j in industry k 
in year t; TA
jk,t-1
 = are total assets for firm j in 
industry k at the end of year t-1; REV
jk,t
 = 
change net sales for firm j in industry k be-
tween years t-1 and t; REC
jk,t
 = change in 
receivables for firm j in industry k between 
years t-1 and t; PPE
jk,t 
= gross property, plant 
and equipment for firm j in industry k in the 
year t; 
j
, 
j
, 
j 
= industry specific estimated 
coefficients; and 
j
 = error term. 
 
NAC is defined as the fitted values from Equa-
tion 2 whilst DAC is the residual (TAC minus 
NAC).  
 
To control compounding influences of 
cross-sectional factors, this study incorporates 
control variables in the regression analysis. 
This study includes absolute value of total ac-
cruals (ABSTAccruals) to control for a firm’s 
‘accrual-generating potential’ (Becker et al. 
1998). Firms with higher absolute values of 
total accruals are likely to have greater discre-
tionary accruals (Krishnan 2003). Thus, the 
current study expects a significant positive 
coefficient on the ABSTAccruals variable. Le-
verage is included as prior studies show that 
firms have a propensity to smooth reported 
earnings to avoid violating debt covenants and 
to decrease the cost of debt (Carlson and Ba-
thala 1997). In addition, some scholars (e.g., 
Healy and Palepu 1990; DeFond and Jiambal-
vo 1994; Sweeney 1994) posit that firms with 
a higher likelihood of violating debt agree-
ments are more likely to have an incentive to 
increase earnings. This study argues that firms 
with a higher level of debt have more incen-
tive to manage reported earnings. The proxy 
variable for level of debt is the ratio of total 
debt to total equity of the previous year. Pre-
vious studies (e.g., Dechow, Sloan and Swee-
ney 1995; Kothari, Leone and Wasley 2002) 
report discretionary accruals is dependent on a 
firm’s financial performance. This is because 
financial performance may affect corporate 
management’s opportunistically to manage 
earnings figures. Furthermore, financial per-
formance may influence a firm’s audit risk 
(e.g., Gul, Chen and Tsui 2003; Krishnan 
2003). Thus, return on assets (ROA) is used to 
control for the possible compounding influ-
ences of a firm’s financial performance. Tseng 
and Lai (2007) state that more profitable firms 
are associated with less earnings management. 
Thus, this study expects that the coefficient of 
this variable is significantly negative asso-
ciated with the level of earnings management. 
ROA is defined as the ratio of earnings before 
extraordinary items to total assets of prior 
year. Furthermore, this study includes a varia-
ble of Invest measured by the level of invest-
ment in tangible fixed assets in current year 
scaled by total assets of previous year. This 
variable can result in smaller total accruals 
due to the associated increase in depreciation 
expense. This current study predicts a signifi-
cant and negative coefficient on this variable. 
Becker et al. (1998) and Reynolds and Francis 
(2001), amongst others, report cash flow from 
operations influence corporate management 
actions in managing earnings. Thus, this study 
includes CFO to control for discretionary ac-
cruals dependence on cash flow from opera-
tions and predict a negative association be-
tween CFO and the level of earnings man-
agement. Finally, this study includes a varia-
ble of legal origin as another variable that is 
considered will influence the practices of earn-
ings management. Proxy measures for the de-
pendent, independent and control variables are 
defined in Table 2. 
To test the hypotheses on audit quality, 
culture value and size of firm, this study de-
velops the following multivariate model: 
AbsDAC
i
 = a
i
 + α
i1 
Auditquality
i
 + α
i2
Culture
i
 
+ α
i3
Size
i
 + α
i4 
Leverage
i
 + α
i5
ROA
i
 + 
α
i6
AbsTAC
i
 + α
i7
Invest
i
 + α
i8
CFO
i
 + 
α
i9
Legal
i
 + 
i 
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Table 2: Variables’ definition and description 
Variable Definition Prediction 
Dependent variable 
AbsDAC 
Independent variables
AuditQuality 
Culture 
 
Size 
Control variables  
AbsTAC 
Leverage 
 
ROA 
 
Invest 
 
CFO 
 
Legal 
Discretionary accruals of firm i for year t measured by Modified 
Jones (1991) model 
Indicator variable with firm i scored 1 if their auditor in fiscal 
year t is a Big-4; zero otherwise  
Cultural values for each country are obtained from Hofstede and 
Bond (1988). 
Natural logarithm of total assets of firm i for their fiscal year t 
Absolute value of total accruals for firm i divided by total assets 
for firm i for year t-1 
Ratio of book value total debt of firm i for year t to book value 
total equity of firm i for year t-1 
Ratio of earnings before extraordinary items of firm i for year t 
to book value total assets of firm i for year t-1 
The amount of the increase or decrease in tangible fixed assets 
for firm i from year t-1 to year t, scaled by last year’s total assets 
Cash flow from operations for firm i during the year t  deflated by 
total assets as at end of year t-1. 
Indicator variable with firm i scored 1 if Common Law country; 
zero otherwise 
- 
 
- 
 
 
? 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
? 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for 
the dependent, independent and control va-
riables. Panel A shows the descriptive statis-
tics for the continuous variables in the regres-
sion model. Panel B exhibits details for the 
categorical variables. 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics dependent, independent and control variables 
Panel A– Continuous variables 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
AbsDAC 
Culture  
0.0846 
64.65 
0.0488 
85.00 
0.1131 
30.37 
0.0001 
8.00 
0.7475 
92.00 
ROA  0.0076 0.0024 0.1000 -0.5932 0.7784 
Leverage 1.2020 0.6700 2.2418 -34.8400 28.7300 
AbsTAC 0.0841 0.0464 0.1163 0.0000 0.7728 
Invest 0.0889 0.0476 0.1959 -1.1413 0.9070 
CFO -0.0613 -0.0499 0.2510 -3.9701 3.3908 
FSize (in th USD) 2,982,587 500,721 7,979,247 2,733 102,499,038 
Panel B – Categorical variables 
    
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Audit quality: 
     
 Non Big 4 
   
521 47.62 
 Big 4 
   
573 52.38 
Legal: 
     
 Non Common law 
   
804 73.49 
 Common law 
   
290 26.51  
Legend: See Table 2 for full definitions and descriptions for the study’s dependent, independent and con-
trol variables.  
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Table 3 shows that the mean and me-
dian absolute values of total accruals (Ab-
sDAC) are 8.46% and 4.88% of total assets at 
the beginning of the year. The data reveals 
that number of firms that have positive and 
negative discretionary accruals is 537 and 557 
firms respectively. This implies that more 
companies engage in income-decreasing com-
pared to income-increasing earnings manage-
ment. In regard to the uncertainty avoidance 
cultural dimension, on average, the index 
score is 64.65 ranging from the lowest 8 (Sin-
gapore) and the highest 92 (Japan). Return on 
assets (ROA) averages 0.76% ranging from -
59.32% to 77.84%. Consistent with the low 
ROA, those firms generate, on average, nega-
tive amounts (-6.13% of the beginning total 
assets) of cash flow from operations. Ratio 
total debt to total equity (Leverage) has a 
mean of 120%. The average absolute value of 
total accruals (AbsTAC) is 8.41% of total as-
sets at the beginning of the year. On average, 
amount of the increase in tangible fixed assets 
for scaled by last year’s total assets is 8.89%. 
The sample firms have a mean total assets of 
USD2,982,587 thousand. Finally, around 52% 
of the sample firms use the services of Big 4 
audit firms and 27% of the sample firms are 
from common law countries.  
Table 4 depicts a correlation matrix be-
tween the dependent, experimental and control 
variables. The upper half of each panel reports 
Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients (cr
p
), 
the lower half shows Spearman correlation 
coefficients (cr
s
). The correlation results do 
not provide comprehensive support for the 
study’s hypotheses. AbsDAC is negatively and 
significantly (at p<0.01) correlated with Cul-
ture and Size both for Pearson and Spearman 
correlations. This infers that countries with 
higher uncertainty avoidance scores and large 
size firms are less likely involved in earnings 
management practices. In addition, Table 4 
shows a positive but insignificant correlation 
between Audit Quality and AbsDAC. This evi-
dence is not consistent with the hypothesis and 
previous studies that Big 4 auditors appear to 
constrain manager’s discretions in adopting 
earnings management practices.  
 
 
Findings also show a significant corre-
lation (both cr
p
 and cr
s
) amongst independent 
variables. The highest correlation is between 
Audit Quality and Size, with a coefficient of 
0.235 and 0.225 (p<0.01 both cr
p
 and c
rs
). In 
respect to correlations between independent 
and control variables, and amongst control va-
riables themselves, the highest correlations are 
between Culture and Legal, with a coefficient 
of 0.774 at p<0.01. This value is below the crit-
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ical limit of 0.80. Variance inflation factors 
calculated for all regressions reported in Table 
5 for all independent and control variables pro-
vide further indications that multicollinearity is 
not a problem in the model estimations (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1995; Greene 
1999; Cooper and Schindler, 2003). 
The main results for testing the hypo-
theses are reported in Table 5. Regression 
model estimates reported in Table 5 is statisti-
cally significant (F-statistic p<0.01). The coef-
ficient on Audit quality is positive but insigni-
ficantly associated with AbsDAC. Therefore, 
H
1
 is not supported. Findings reported in nu-
merous studies clearly support that the view 
Big 4 auditors serve as a barometer of higher 
levels of audit quality. Several studies have 
supported this surrogate measure (e.g., Do-
puch and Simunic 1982; Becker et al. 1998; 
Francis et al. 1999; Gore et al. 2001; Bauw-
hede et al. 2003; Krishnan 2003; Chen et al. 
2005; Kanagaretnem, Lim and Lobo 2010). 
This study fails to confirm that in Asia, Big 4 
auditors function as a constraint on earnings 
management practices.  
A consistent finding is that Culture is 
negatively and significantly at p-value of 
0.001 associated with AbsDAC, thus H
2
 is 
supported. This result infers that firms in the 
countries scoring high on uncertainty avoid-
ance (AU) tend to have lower levels of earn-
ings management and therefore higher quality 
of reported earnings. Further analysis (see Ta-
ble 6) reveals that countries with higher score 
of UA have significantly lower levels of earn-
ings management compared with their coun-
terpart. This finding is consistent with Guan 
and Pourjalali (2010).  
 
Table 5: Multiple regression results 
 
Prediction Beta t-statistic p-value 
(Constant) 
  
7.207 0.000 
Independent Variables: 
    
Audit quality 
- 0.005 
0.923 0.356 
Culture 
- 0.001 
-3.483 0.001 
Size 
? -0.008 
-4.808 0.000 
Control Variables: 
    
AbsTAC + 0.382 
20.962 0.000 
Leverage + 0.001 
1.148 0.251 
ROA - -0.030 
-1.622 0.105 
Invest - -0.015 
-2.424 0.016 
CFO - -0.086 
-7.745 0.000 
Legal ? 0.007 
0.673 0.501 
Model Summary 
 
R-Squared 0.420 
Adj. R-Squared 0.415 
F-Statistic 87.205* 
Sample Size 1,094 
Legend: *, **, and *** indicate significance at p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.10 respectively (based on two-tailed tests). 
See Table 2 for full definitions and descriptions for the dependent, independent and control variables. 
 
Table 6: Uncertainty avoidance sub-samples
2
 
 
N 
Earnings Management 
Mean SD t-value Sig 
Low 487 0.1245 0.1489 10.130 0.000 
High 607 0.0525 0.0546   
 1,094 
    

Firm i is defined as High score if it has above the mean value of uncertainty avoidance; otherwise defined as Low score.
	
		 

Table 7: Size of firm sub-samples
3 
 
N 
Earnings Management 
Mean SD t-value Sig 
Small 877 0.0899 0.1175 3.713 0.000 
Large 217 0.0628 0.0902 
  
 
1,094 
    
 
3
Finally, the finding of this study con-
firms that large size firms exhibit less aggres-
sive earnings management behavior. Specifi-
cally, the coefficient on Size is negative and 
significant (at p-value of 0.000) associated 
with earnings management measure. Addi-
tional analysis (see Table 7) shows that large 
sample firms have significantly lower (0.0628 
versus 0.0899) levels of earnings management 
than those small firms. 
Apart from the independent variables, 
the coefficient of absolute value of total ac-
cruals (ABSTAccruals) is positively and sig-
nificantly (p-value of 0.000) associated with 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
This finding is consistent with prior works 
(e.g., Frankel, Johnson and Nelson 2002; Ash-
baugh, LaFond and Mayhew 2003; Balsam, 
Krishnan and Yang 2003). Coefficient on 
ROA is negative but only significant at the 
bottom line level. This result confirms the ar-
gument that behavior in earnings management 
is adversely associated with company perfor-
mance: the better the company’s financial per-
formance the lesser the tendency to manage 
reported earnings (Firth 1997; Frankel et al 
2002; Ashbaugh et al 2003; Ferguson et al 
2004). In addition coefficients on Invest and 
CFO are all negative and significant (at p-
values of 0.016 and 0.000 respectively) mean-
ing that firms with a greater level of invest-
ment in fixed assets and larger cash flows 
from operations are less likely to manage in-
come figures. These results directly conflict 
with several previous non-Asian studies (De-
chow et al. 1995; Kaszni 1999; Bauwhede et 
al. 2003; Butler, Leone and Willenborg 2004) 
that document that firms with high perfor-

 This study partitions the full sample into small and 
large firm sub-samples using the mean of total assets 
(USD$2,982,587 thousands) as a basis for partitioning 
cut-off.
mance and growth are more likely to relate to 
the amount of managed earnings. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study is to identify factors 
that may impact earnings management, thus 
quality of reported earnings. Based on the lite-
rature review, this study infers three factors: 
audit quality, culture and the size of firms. 
This study does not find evidence that Big 4 
auditors work as a constraint for earnings 
management practices by corporate managers. 
Hunt and Lulseged (2007) suggest that one 
possible explanation is that the Big 4 audit 
market has dramatically decreased, especially 
after the global influence of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, as substantial numbers of 
audit clients of Big 4 auditors are switching to 
non-Big 4 audit firms. This phenomenon re-
sults in a smaller Big 4 audit market and thus 
larger economic dependence of the Big 4 audi-
tors on their remaining audit clients. Another 
possibility that might explain the decline of 
Big 4 auditors’ quality is that this study utiliz-
es a dataset from the countries in which exter-
nal auditors face lower litigation risks com-
pared to countries like U.S. or U.K. The Big 4 
auditors may have very little incentive to re-
port conservatively due to the lack of auditor 
litigation in many Asian countries. 
The multivariate regression analyses 
reveal that culture and firm’s size influence 
earnings reporting quality corporate manage-
ment. Countries with high score of uncertainty 
avoidance are more likely to have lower levels 
of earnings management and therefore higher 
quality of reported earnings. In addition, the 
result of this study strongly supports the polit-
ical costs hypothesis which argues that in 
comparison to smaller firms, larger firms are 
subject to more public scrutiny and political 
actions (Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Moses 
	
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1987). In particular, larger firms have incen-
tives to choose the accounting procedures that 
result in reducing reported earnings. Several 
previous studies provide confirmatory evi-
dence. For example, Lilien and Pastena (1982) 
and Sutton (1988) report that large firms are 
more likely to engage in income-decreasing 
accounting practices to avoid political actions 
of regulators. Key (1997) notes downward 
earnings management in the U.S. cable televi-
sion industry, while Han and Wang (1998) 
show similar behavior by U.S. oil companies 
due to high political costs. In addition, Boyn-
ton, Dobbins and Plesko (1992) find empirical 
evidence that U.S. firms directly affected by 
the enforcement of a tax change try to avoid 
its effects by implementing conservative ac-
counting procedures. Another possible expla-
nation why larger firms are not involved in 
earnings management is they may have more 
sophisticated internal control systems and 
more competent internal auditors than smaller 
firms. The result is a reduction in the likelih-
ood of manipulating earnings by corporate 
management.  
Like any other empirical investigation, 
this study is not without certain caveats. Com-
plete earnings management is unobservable 
thus this study relies on proxy measures that, 
whilst previously used in the research litera-
ture, are not free from criticism. For instance, 
discretionary accrual models measure discre-
tionary accruals with error (see Bernard and 
Skinner 1996, for a deeper discussion). These 
problems, however, are endemic to the earn-
ings management literature and this study is 
using the best currently available models and 
proxies.  
 
REFERENCES  
Agarwal, S., Chomsisengphet, S., Liu, C., and 
Rhee, S. G. 2007. Earnings manage-
ment behaviors under different eco-
nomic environments: evidence from 
Japanese banks. International Review 
of Economic and Finance 16 (3): 429-
443. 
Arya, A., Glover, J. C., and Sunder, S. 2003. 
Are unmanaged earnings always better 
for shareholders?. Accounting Hori-
zons, 17(Supplement): 111-116. 
Ashari, N., Koh, H. C., Tan, S. L., and Wong, 
W. H. 1994. Factors affecting income 
smoothing among listed companies in 
Singapore. Accounting and Business 
Research 24 (96): 291-301. 
Ashbaugh, H., LaFond, R., and Mayhew, B. 
W. 2003. Do non-audit services com-
promise auditor independence? further 
evidence. The Accounting Review 78 
(3): 611-639. 
Atik, A. 2009. Detecting income-smoothing 
behaviors of Turkish listed companies 
through empirical tests using discretio-
nary accounting changes. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 20 (4): 
591-613. 
Ball, R., and Shivakumar, L. 2008. Earnings 
quality at initial public offerings. Jour-
nal of Accounting and Economics 45 
(3): 324-349. 
Balsam, S., Krishnan, G. V., and Yang, J. S. 
2003. Auditor industry specialization 
and earnings quality. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory 22 (2): 
71-97. 
Bartov, E., Gul, F. A., and Tsui, J. S. L. 2000. 
Discretionary-accruals models and au-
dit qualifications. Journal of Account-
ing and Economics 30 (3): 421-452. 
Bauwhede, H. V., Willekens, M., and Gaere-
mynck, A. 2003. Audit firm size, pub-
lic ownership, and firms' discretionary 
accruals management. The Interna-
tional Journal of Accounting 38 (1): 1-
22. 
Becker, C. L., DeFond, M. L., Jiambalvo, J., 
and Subramanyam, K. R. 1998. The ef-
fect of audit quality on earnings man-
agement. Contemporary Accounting 
Research 15 (1): 1-24. 
	
		 

Bergstresser, D., Desai, M., and Rauh, J. 2006. 
Earnings manipulation and managerial 
investment decisions: evidence from 
sponsored pension plans. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 121 (2): 157-
196. 
Bergstresser, D., and Philippon, T. 2006. CEO 
incentives and earnings management: 
Evidence from the 1990s. Journal of 
Financial Economics 80 (4): 511-529. 
Bernard, V. L., and Skinner, D. J. 1996. What 
motivates managers' choice of discre-
tionary accruals? Journal of Account-
ing and Economics 22 (1-3): 313-325. 
Boynton, C. E., Dobbins, P. S., and Plesko, G. 
A. 1992. Earnings management and 
the corporate alternative minimum tax. 
Journal of Accounting Research 30 
(Supplement): 131-153. 
Burgstahler, D., and Dichev, I. D. 1997. Earn-
ings management to avoid earnings 
decreases and losses. Journal of Ac-
counting and Economics 24 (1): 99-
126. 
Burgstahler, D., and Eames, M. 2006. Man-
agement of earnings and analysts' fore-
casts to achieve zero and small positive 
earnings surprises. Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting 33 (5): 633-
652. 
Burns, N., and Kedia, S. 2006. The impact of 
performance-based compensation on 
misreporting. Journal of Financial 
Economics 79 (1): 35-67. 
Butler, M., Leone, A. J., and Willenborg, M. 
2004. An empirical analysis of auditor 
reporting and its association with ab-
normal accruals. Journal of Account-
ing and Economics 37 (2): 139-165. 
Caneghem, T. V. 2004. The impact of audit 
quality on earnings rounding-up beha-
viour: some UK evidence. European 
Accounting Review 13 (4): 771-786. 
Carlson, S. J., and Bathala, C. T. 1997. Ow-
neership differences and firm income 
smoothing behavior. Journal of Busi-
ness Finance and Accounting 24 (2): 
181-195. 
Charitou, A., Lambertides, N., and L. Trigeor-
gis. 2007. Managerial discretion in dis-
tressed firms. The British Accounting 
Review 39 (3): 323-346. 
Chen, K. Y., Lin, K., and Zhou, J. 2005. Audit 
quality and earnings management for 
Taiwan IPO firms. Managerial Audit-
ing Journal 20 (1): 86-104. 
Chung, R., Firth, M., and Kim, J. B. 2005. 
Earnings management, surplus free 
cash flow, and external monitoring. 
Journal of Business Research 58 (6): 
766-776. 
Coles, J. L., Hertzel, M., and Kalpathy, S. 
2003. Earnings management around 
employee stock option reissues. Work-
ing Paper, Arizona State University, 
U.S. 
Cooper, D. R., and Schindler, P. S. 2003. 
Business research methods (eight edi-
tion). Boston: McGraw-Hill. 
Daniel, N. D., Denis, D, J., and Naveen, L. 
2008. Do firms manage earnings to 
meet dividend thresholds?. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 45 (1): 2-
26. 
Daske, H., Gebhardt, G., and McLeay, S. 
2006. The distribution of earnings rela-
tive to targets in the European Union. 
Accounting and Business Research 36 
(3): 137-167. 
DeAngelo, L. E. 1981. Auditor size and audit 
quality. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 3 (3): 183-199. 
Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., and Sweeney, 
A.P. 1995. Detecting earnings man-
agement. The Accounting Review 70 
(2): 193-225. 
DeFond, M. L., and Jiambalvo, J. 1994. Debt 
covenant violation and manipulation of 
accruals. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 17 (1 & 2): 145-176. 
	

13 
Degeorge, F., Patel, J., and Zeckhauser, R. 
1999. Earnings management to exceed 
thresholds. Journal of Business 72 (1): 
1-33. 
Dopuch, N., and Simunic, D.A. 1982. The 
competition in auditing: an assessment. 
Fourth Symposium on Auditing Re-
search. Urbana, U.S. 
Erickson, M., and Wang, S. 1999. Earnings 
management by acquiring firms in 
stock for stock mergers. Journal of Ac-
counting and Economics 27 (2): 149-
176. 
Ferguson, M. J., Seow, G. S., and Young, D. 
2004. Non-audit services and earnings 
management: U.K. evidence. Contem-
porary Accounting Research 21 (4): 
813-841. 
Firth, M. 1997. The provision of non-audit 
services by accounting firms to their 
audit clients. Contemporary Account-
ing Research 14 (2): 1-21. 
Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P. M., and 
Shipper, K. 2004. Costs of equity and 
earnings attributes. The Accounting 
Review 79 (4): 967-1010. 
Francis, J. R., Maydew, E. L., and Sparks, H. 
C. 1999. The role of big 6 auditors in 
the credible reporting of accruals. Au-
diting: A Journal of Practice & Theory 
18 (2): 17-34. 
Frankel, R. M., Johnson, M. F., and Nelson, 
M. W. 2002. The relation between au-
ditors' fees for non-audit services and 
earnings management. The Accounting 
Review, 77 (Supplement): 71-105. 
Gong, S. X. H., Firth, M., and Cullinane, K. 
2006. The information content of earn-
ings releases by global airlines. Jour-
nal of Air Transport Management 12 
(1): 82-91. 
Gore, P., Pope, P., and Singh, A. 2001. Non-
audit services, auditor independence 
and earnings management. Working 
Paper. Lancester University Manage-
ment School, U.K. 
Gore, P., Pope, P. F., and Singh, A. K. 2007. 
Earnings management and the distribu-
tion of earnings relative to targets: UK 
evidence. Accounting and Business 
Research 37 (2): 123-149. 
Gramlich, J. 1992. Discussion of earnings 
management and the corporate alterna-
tive minimum tax. Journal of Account-
ing Research, 30 (Supplement): 154-
160. 
Gray, S. J. 1988. Towards a theory of cultural 
influence on the development of ac-
counting systems internationally. AB-
ACUS. (1-15). 
Greene, W. 1999. Econometric analysis 
(Fourth edition). New York: Prentice-
Hall, Inc. 
Guan, L., and Pourjalali, H. 2010. Effect of 
cultural environmental and accounting 
regulation on earnings management: a 
multiple year-country analysis. Asia-
Pacific Journal of Accounting & Eco-
nomics 17 (1): 99-127. 
Gul, F. A., Chen, C. J. P., and Tsui, J. S. L. 
2003. Discretionary accounting ac-
cruals, managers' incentives, and audit 
fees. Contemporary Accounting Re-
search 20 (3): 441-464. 
Hair, J. F., Anderson, E. E., Tatham, R. L., 
and Black, W. C. 1995. Multivariate 
data analysis (fourth edition). Engle-
wood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Han, J. C. Y., and Wang, S. 1998. Political 
costs and earnings management of oil 
companies during the 1990 Persian 
Gulf crisis. The Accounting Review 73 
(1): 103-117. 
Healy, P. M. 1985. The effect of bonus 
schemes on accounting decisions. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 
7 (1-3): 85-107. 
Healy, P. M., and Palepu, K. G. 1990. Effec-
tiveness of accounting-based dividend 
	
		 

covenants. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 12 (1-3): 97-123. 
Hofstede, G. 1983. National cultures in four 
dimensions: A research-theory of cul-
tural differences among nations. Inter-
national Studies of Management and 
Organization: 46-74. 
Hofstede, G. 1991. Culture and organizations, 
software of the mind. McGraw-Hill 
Book Company. 
Hofstede, G., and Bond, M. H. 1988. The con-
fusius connection: From cultural roots 
to economic growth. Organizational 
Dynamics, 16 (Spring): 5-21. 
Hunt, A. K., and Lulseged, A. 2007. Client 
importance and non-Big 5 auditors' re-
porting decisions. Journal of Account-
ing and Public Policy 26 (2): 212-248. 
Imhoff, E. A. 2003. Accounting quality, audit-
ing, and corporate governance. Ac-
counting horizons, 17 (Supplement): 
117-128. 
Jackson, S. B., and Pitman, M. K. 2001. Audi-
tors and earnings management. The 
CPA Journal 71 (7): 38-44. 
Jaggi, B., and Lee, P. 2002. Earnings man-
agement response to debt covenant vi-
olations and debt restructuring. Jour-
nal of Accounting, Auditing and 
Finance 17 (4): 295-324. 
Jaggi, B., and Leung, S. 2007. Impact of fami-
ly dominance on monitoring of earn-
ings management by audit committees: 
evidence from Hong Kong. Journal of 
International Accounting, Auditing & 
Taxation 16 (1): 27-50. 
Jones, J. J. 1991. Earnings management during 
import relief investigations. Journal of 
Accounting Research 29 (2): 193-228. 
Kanagaretnem, K., C. Y. Lim, and Lobo, G. J. 
2010. Auditor reputation and earnings 
management: international evidence 
from the banking industry. Journal of 
Banking and Finance 34 (10): 2318-
2327. 
Kasanen, E., Kinnunen, J., and Niskanen, J. 
1996. Dividend-based earnings man-
agement: empirical evidence from Fin-
land. Journal of Accounting and Eco-
nomics 22 (3): 283-312. 
Kasznik, R. 1999. On the association between 
voluntary disclosure and earnings 
management. Journal of Accounting 
Research 37 (1): 57-81. 
Key, K. G. 1997. Political cost incentives for 
earnings management in the cable tel-
evision industry. Journal of Account-
ing and Economics 23 (3): 309-337. 
Kothari, S. P., Leone, A. J., and Wasley, C. E. 
2002. Performance matched discretio-
nary accrual measures. Working Pa-
per. MIT Sloan School of Manage-
ment, U.S. 
Krishnan, G. V. 2003. Does big 6 auditor in-
dustry expertise constrain earnings 
management? Accounting horizons, 17 
(Supplement): 1-16. 
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., and Wysocki, P. D. 2003. 
Earnings management and investor 
protection: an international compari-
son. Journal of Financial Economics 
69 (3): 505-527. 
Lilien, S., and Pastena, V. 1982. Determinants 
of intramethod choice in the oil and 
gas industry. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 4 (3): 145-170. 
Louis, H. 2004. Earnings management and 
market performance of acquiring 
firms. Journal of Financial Economics 
74 (2): 121-148. 
Moses, O. D. 1987. Income smoothing and 
incentives: empirical tests using ac-
counting changes. The Accounting Re-
view 62 (2): 358-377. 
Moyer, S. E. 1990. Capital adequacy ratio 
regulations and accounting choices in 
commercial banks. Journal of Ac-
counting and Economics 13 (2): 123-
154. 
	

15 
Perry, S. E., and Williams, T. H. 1994. Earn-
ings management preceding manage-
ment buyout offers. Journal of Ac-
counting and Economics 18 (2): 157-
179. 
Rangan, S. 1998. Earnings management and 
the performance of seasoned equity of-
ferings. Journal of Financial Econom-
ics 50 (1): 101-122. 
Reynolds, J. K., and Francis, J. R. 2001. Does 
size matter? the influence of large 
clients on office-level auditor reporting 
decisions. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 30 (3): 375-400. 
Rodrigue, J. P. 2010. Maritime transportation: 
drivers for the shipping and port indus-
tries. Retrieved from 
http://www.internationaltransportforu
m.org/Proceedings/Genoa2010/Rodrig
ue.pdf. 
Rodrigue, J. P., and Comtois, C. 2009. Trans-
portation and energy. Retrieved 14 
May 2009, from 
Http://www.people.hofstra.edu/geotran
s/eng/ch8en/conc8en/ch8c2en.html.  
Scott, T. W. 1991. Pension disclosures under 
SFAS No. 87: Theory and evidence. 
Contemporary Accounting Research 8 
(1): 62-81. 
Shivakumar, L. 2000. Do firms mislead inves-
tors by overstating earnings before 
seasoned equity offerings? Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 29 (3): 
339-371. 
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. 1997. A sur-
vey of corporate governance. The 
Journal of Finance 52 (2): 737-783. 
Steven, C. H. 2002. Predicting financial dis-
tress. Journal of Financial Service 
Professionals 56 (3): 14-15. 
Sutton, T. 1988. The proposed introduction of 
current cost accounting in the UK: de-
terminants of corporate preference. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 
10 (2): 127-149. 
Sweeney, A. P. 1994. Debt-covenant viola-
tions and managers' accounting res-
ponses. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 17 (3): 281-308. 
Teoh, S. H., Welch, I., and Wong, T. J. 1998a. 
Earnings management and the under-
performance of seasoned equity offer-
ings. Journal of Financial Economics 
50 (1): 63-99. 
Teoh, S. H., Wong, T. J., and Rao, G. R., 
1998. Are accruals during initial public 
offerings opportunistic? Review of Ac-
counting Studies 3 (1&2): 175-208. 
Teoh, S. W., Welch, I., and Wong, T. J. 
1998b. Earnings management and the 
long-run market performance of initial 
public offerings. Journal of Finance 53 
(6): 1935-1974. 
Tong, Y. H., and Miao, B. 2011. Are divi-
dends associated with the quality of 
earnings? Accounting horizons 25 (1): 
183-205. 
Tseng, L. J., and Lai, C. W., 2007. The rela-
tionship between income smoothing 
and company profitability: an empiri-
cal study. International Journal of 
Management 24 (4): 727-733. 
Velury, U., and Jenkins, D. 2006. Institutional 
ownership and the quality of earnings. 
Journal of Business Research 59 (4): 
1043-1051. 
Walker, R. G. 2004. Gaps in guidelines on au-
dit committee. ABACUS 40 (2): 157-
192. 
Watts, R. L., and Zimmerman, J. L. 1986. 
Positive accounting theory. Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Wong J. 1988. Political costs and intraperiod 
accounting choice for export tax cre-
dits. Journal of Accounting and Eco-
nomics 10 (1): 27-51. 
 
